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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

J,

o.

KINGSTON,
Plaintiff and
Appellant,
vs,

GREAT SOUTHWEST FIRE
INSURANCE COMPANY, a
corporation,
Defendant and
Respondent,

*
*
*
*

Case No.

15323

*

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This is an action brought by the named insured against the
insurance company on a policy of fire insurance covering a warehouse
building which was damaged by fire,
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COOR T
The case was submitted to the trial court by way of stipulation
as to the material facts,

From a judgment in favor of the defendant, the

plaintiff appeals,
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff seeks reversal of the judgment and judgment in
els d

matter of law,
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
The defendant, Great Southwest Fire I
issued fire

nsurance Co'Tlpar:i,;

insurance policy #F442655, dated May 10

•

1975 na .
,

min~t

Plaintiff, J. O. Kingston, as the insured, ai:d covering a warehouse
building located at approximately 875 South 800 West, Salt Lake Citr,
Utah (Exhibit "B"),

In September, 1975, during the term of effective

coverage under the insurance policy, the building burned,

causingda~
i

thereto in excess of $20, 000, 00, the limits of coverage under thepoli.
(Tr, 2-3),
I

On July 3, 197 5, prior to the fire, Salt Lake City Corporii

I

filed a complaint in condemnation, seeking to condemn the parcel of
property upon which the insured building was located, in order that a
Senior Citizens' Center could be constructed thereon,

On August 12,

I

I
1975, still prior to the fire, the city was granted an Order of Immedi: i

I
Occupancy with respect to the property sought to be condemned. De;i'
the order of immediate occupancy, J,

o.

Kingston was still in actual :

possession of the building and was using it as a warehouse for
chandise when the fire occurred,

.

The condemnation act10n

wa

h.15 mer·

!

s conte;:.j
1

I

o the properl)' i: !
and the final order of condemnation vesting legal title t

Salt Lake City Corporation, was not signed until May, 1976, eightmo·:i
1 "A")
after the building had been burned (Tr, 2-3 and Exh1'b't
'
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During the pendency of the condemnation action, J.

o.

Kingston commenced this action against Great Southwest Fire Insurance
Co:npany, seeking recovery under the terms of the insurance contract
(R. Z-3),

The trial court found that" J. O. Kingston did not have an

insurable interest in the warehouse building at the date it burned, and
therefore, denied recovery (R. 91-92),
ARGUMENT

POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED A5 A MATTER OF LAW IN FINDING THAT
PLAINTIFF HAD NO INSURABLE INTEREST IN THE INSURED BUILDING

AT THE TIME OF THE FffiE.
The bas is for the ruling in the court be low was that the
plaintiff had no insurable interest in the insured property at the time of
the loss, as a result of the condemnation activity of Salt Lake City Corporation,

Section 31-19-4, U.C.A, (1953), provides as follows:
'{l) No contract of insurance on property or of any
interest therein or arising therefrom, shall be enforceable except for the benefit of persons having an insurable
interest in the things insured,
(2) 1 Insurable interest• as used in this section means
any lawful and substantial economic interest in the safety
or preservation of the subject of the insurance free from
loss, destruction, or pecuniary damage,"
In determining whether or not an insurable interest exists

in a p1 r t lCU
· l ar

·
case, the courts have generally adopted a 11· b era l view
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in order to uphold the enforceability of the insurance contract,
In the case of Hill v, Safeco Insurance Co:np3.nv, 2! ..

96,

448 P, Zd 915 (1969), this Court stated:

"Any_ i_n
. t eres t rn
. property, l egal or equitable, quali'.'e:.
cond1t1onal, .contingent or absolute, or merely the ro::·
to use property with or without p3.yrnent of rent is 5 ~:.
ficient to create finsurable interest', 11
'
In the Hill case, the named insured under a policyoi:::.,
had deeded the property covered (his house) to his wife,

The wiie,·.:

the named insured each had children from a previous marriage,~'.'·
wife disinherited her husb3.nd and her husband 1 s children by will,l"
her assets to her own children,

As it happened, the house burne:'. ::

killing both the named insured and his wife in the process, and the ::d
children sought recovery from the insurnace company on the polic\·:
insurance,

The insurance comp3.ny defended the claim, allegingt2;:

named insured had no insurable interest in the property at the time::
burned, since he had given up legal title tc his wife, who had in tur:.
willed the property to her own children,

The Court rejected the i&o::.

cornpanyrs argument, holding that where the husband had purchas:::
property, p3.id the insurance premium, lived in the house for sel'e:'·
years, paid the taxes, and had the right of occup3.ncy, he

hadar.i~s;:.'

interest therein, and his heirs \Vere awarded recovery on tae pol'.c\·.
insurance,
The case of Stewart v. Co'Tlmerce

ln°ur·1 ~--
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S'.c. ~~c.lls, N. Y., 114 Ut, 278, 198 P. 2d 467, was one involving auto-

;:i;:.c'Je insurance, but one of the issues was whether or not the claimants
tad an insurable interest in the vehicle at the time it was damaged,

The

1.utomo'.iile was owned and insured by a gentleman who died leaving six
te:rs,

The automobile p3.ssed to the heirs, who decided to sell it,

One

of the heirs located a buyer and sold the car for a price to be determined

:n occordance with the O. P, A, regulations then in effect,
the

~eir

$400, 00 for the car, took possession of the vehicle, the title and

~e~istration

'>'.'i.5

The buyer gave

certificates, and started towards Logan, Utah, where he

to determine the official 0, P.A. price and arrange to have the title

and registration properly transferred,

In route to Logan, the buyer ran

off the ro'id, causing extensive damage to the car, and the insured 1 s

estate sued to recover under the insurance policy,

The Court rejected

tile insurance comp3.ny1s defense that the estate lacked an insurable

interest in the car at the time it was damaged, stating:
"***it is apparent that no valid sale was completed. If
such is the case the fact that an abortive attempt was
made, would not relieve the defendant from liability
under the policy, as the estate would have an insurable
interest in the car until such time as a completed sale
was effectuated. 11
National Farmers Union Property and Casualty Co:npany

~~~ 4 Ut, 2d 7, 286 P. 2d 249 {1955), was another case where

t".''

C~ttrt v;as asked to determine whether or not an insurable interest
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existed in the named insured.
to one Hardy.

In that case, Tho!npson had sold h' f·
l s d~-

Hardy had taken possession of the farm 1 except f or

I

i

o~:t

building, which Thomp3on continued to occupy with Hardy's permissic
for storage of machinery and equip!ne!lt,

Thompson continued to occu:,

the building up to 3.nd including the date it was destroyed by fire, In
upholding a jury•s finding that Tho!npson retained an insurable intere 11
in the building even though it had been sold to another, the Co·Jrt mado :
the following pertinent comments:
"**~'if he has an interest of any character in the proper:,
so that he will or may derive some pecuniary benefitfrc:;
the co::itinu_ed existenc~ of the. p:;:-operty or suffer pzcunia·
loss from its destruct10n by fire, he may prop~rly bi;,:,
to meet the statutory requirement o~ having a lsubstanti2:'
economic interest•, If this test is met, that suffices, ani I
the nature of his interest or the status of title or posse:,'
is immaterial, 11
1

1'

The Court went on to say:
"It is not disputed that Thomp3on did retain possessionc'
the building that his machine:;:-y was stored therein, ar.:
'
that he had never
turned the keys over to Mr. Hardy, "
The Court also pointed out that there was some testimo:
that Thompson had obligated himself to be responsible for the builciini
1

11"d f 0 r the

during his possession and that the owner expected to be P
occupancy.

-on had an
The Court ruled that upon such facts, Tl10rn P°
~

·ns urance comp 3 nY ;...
insurable interest int h e proper t y, and that the l
pay on the contract of insurance,
.
S\tpport the P'
Several cases from other jurisdictions
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position that he is entitled to reco,·er in this case, holding that as long as
the property owner retains either legal title or possession, he has an
insurable interest sufficient to allow recovery under the insurance contract, In the case at bar, the plaintiff had both legal title and possession,
Among such cases is

Irwin v, Westchester Fi!:_e Insurance Co., 58 Misc,

441, 109 NYS 612, affd without op 133 App Div 920, 118 NYS 1115, affd
without op 199 NY 550, 93 NE 376, where the court ruled that the plaintiff
still had an insurable interest in a frame addition to her house which had
burned, even though the addition violated the City Fire Code and had been
declared a nuisance and ordered abated by the Court prior to the fire,
In this particular case, the City had even commenced demolition of the

structure pursuant to the abatement order, at the time it. burned,

The

owner, as in our case, retained possession and occupancy of the condemned
portion of the structure, and as she was the legal owner, was declared to
have a sufficient interest in the structure to support a reco'lery under the
insurance policy,
An insurable interest was also found to be present in the
case of Rosenbloom v, Maryland Insurance Comp-3.ny, 258 App Div 14,
l5 NYS 2d 304,

There, the property owner contracted on September 23,

1938 to sell his property to the Syracuse Housing Authority for the sum
of $l2, 600, 00,

Under the terms of the contract, the Authority had the

option for 180 days to acquire the property by condemnation rather than
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by purchase.

On September 30, 1938, the building on the propertyw,

damaged by fire, and the Authority then rescinded the sales c t
on ract econdemned the property, paying the property owner the sum of $12 )'
'.
The court declared that the plaintiff's insurable interest at the time cl
the fire was the full value of the insured buil.ding, not just the diminis'
market value, as determined by the difference between the originals,:
price and the award in condemnation.
The Illinois Court, in the case of American National Boe.

& Trust Comp3.ny of Chicago v. Reserve Insurance Co'Tlp:i.ny, 38 lll.l.•:
Zd 315, 187 NE Zd 343 (1962), also held that the building owner had;c
insurable interest in a building which burned after condemnation proce
ings had commenced, but before the condemnation proceedings were
co~pleted,

There, the Court said:
"It is the defendant's next contention that recovery shout:
be denied on the grounds that the insured lacked an insur:
interest in the premises at the time of the fire, '~*~' Tbe
petition was still pending and undisposed of at the time_c
the fire. A jury subsequently entered a verdict of $6k.•
in the condemnation proceedincrs representing the value .
the property at the time the pe~ition to condemn was fde;:·
Defendant suggests that the jury's verdict having been'.
firmed
~' title re late s back to the date of filing the p;
.
b the conies
to condemn, upon payment of compensat10n Y
authority,

**

.
. sofar as i:
We think there is no merit to this contention in
b
is directed to the relevant question of plaintiff's insur1~'
d t
the city.
interest on the date of the fire. At that a e,
Attl:e
petition was pending but had not been actc_d uponl.e al tit:
date of the fire there had been no change tn the g
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to t\,e property, or even a jury verdict in the proceedings
by the city. At that stage of the condemnation proceedings
the city might have abandoned its petition altogether upon
payment of the property owners' expenses in the proceedings, as provided by statute ~' ~' ~'. This being so, it seems
clear to us that plaintiff did have an insurable interest in
the property on the day of the fire, The fact that the city
continued its proceedings against the property after the
fire, rather than exercising its statutory prerogative to
abandon them, is certainly a fe>rtunate circumstance for
the plaintiff, but it is not an event which defendant may
seize in an effort to avoid liability on its contract of insurance,

*

~' ~' Accordingly, we are of the opinion that the condemnation award received by plaintiff does not limit or bar
plaintiff's right to recover in this action, 11

The Virginia Court reached the same conclusion in the case
of Home Insurance Co, v, Dalis, 206 Va, 71, 141 SE 2d 721 (1965).

In

this case, two barns located on plaintiff's property were insured against
fire,

On April 22, 1963, the State Highway Commission recorded a

certificate describing the road right-of-way and stating the fair market
value of the plaintiff's lands located within said right-of-way to be
$113, 666, 00,

Under Virginia law, upon such recording, the title to the

property vested in the Commonwealth,

The barns were destroyed by

fire on April 27, 1963, and on April 29, 1963, the State notified plaintiffs
to vacate the barns within 60 days,

On September 27, 1963, plaintiffs

applied for and obtained an order of the Court, distributing the sum of

$113, 666, 00, the full amount of the appraised value before the fire, to
plaintiffs for the property.

The insurance code of Virginia contains the

sanie requirements that recovery can be had under a contract of insurance
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on property, only by one having an insurable interest therein, as fc:·:
in Utah law, and the Virginia code defines "insurable interest" prec
as does Section 31-19-4, U.C.A. (1953). cited above,

The Courtr'::O

in the Virginia case, that on the date of the fire, plaintiffs had an ic:.interest in the barns sufficient to support the. contract of insurance,,.
that their interest was to be measured by the value of the barns at t'.:
date.

In rejecting the insurance comp3.ny 1 s defense that plaintif:s t::

no insurable interest in the barns on the date of the fire, the Co·Jrt o:
"Under the provisions of the aforementioned statutes t'.:
acquired, upon the filing of the Co"'::J'.55
er 1 s certificate, title to plaintifis' property, but itv:<0s
subject to defeasance and other steps were necessary
before it could ripen into an absolute and indefeasible::

Co:nmo~we2.lth

In the present case, the plaintiffs had a lawful and subs:o:
tial economic interest in the safety of the barns on tee'.:
of the loss, They were not only in possession and occ,::·
of the buildings, in which they had stored valuable ma:e::
when the fire occurred, but had the right to continue o:·:.·
pying them for sixty days from April 29, 1963, -·· .,;_
Defendant says that plaintiffs would suffer no pecuniar:; ..
by reason of the fire and they are not entitled to recoi-.::
under the policy of insurance sued on, It argues that'.'
permit them to recover wo:ild amount to a double reco.c

In Clements v. Clements 167 Va 223, 188 SE 154, rt::
------------'
.
' "<e ofH"::·
Court cited with app:::-oval the holding in the c,_,
~
v. Pepper, 166 Mass 288, 44 I\1E 222,223, 33 LR.-\·; ...
•
t ·" ··- ,, the co .. -·
55 Arn St Rep 404, wherein it was said:
··· ~'
b te·
·
es tot e
of insurance is a personal contract, an d inur
,,,
efit of the p3.rty with whom it is made, and by wh_o~,;>
.
.
.
t f - dcrnn1t1 °o"
premiums are p11d. It is a contrac o in
· h· :::
. -t sense Lt.
loss. The sum paid is in no prop'.!r or JU"
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of prop2rty, (Citing cases) ~' **Whether the amount of
indemnity received by the defendant for her loss was more
or less than the value of her interest cannot affect the
plaintiff 1 , 167 Va at p, 233, 188 SE at p. 158,
Here plain tiffs 1 claim for recovery is based on contract,
The risk of destruction at the time the fire occurred remained with the plaintiffs and the insurance contract was
personal, They had an insurable interest in the buildings
when they were destroyed by fire and they suffered a loss,
Defendant cannot escape liability of its contractual obligations by reason of plaintiffs' dealings with a third party
who is not even a party to this proceeding, (Citing cases)
In a recent Oregon case, Fenter v, General Ace Fire &:

resolved a similar question,

In this case, property formerly owned by

the plaintiff had been taken by the County for non payment of taxes,

An

Oregon statute (ORS 312, ZOO) provided that all rights of redemp~ion to
properties so taken terminated after one year, at which time, the prop·erty
·.'1o•ild be formally deeded to the County,

The one year perio:i for redemp-

tion had expired and the property had been so deeded, when the insured
building thereon was destroyed by fire,

As in Utah, Oregon law (ORS

743, 033) requires the named insured to have an insurable interest in
the subject property of the insurance contract before recovery is allowed.
Even so, the Co'.lrt ruled that the former owner's pecuniary interest was

r.ot too insubstantial to constitute an insurable interest, in view of a
statute which provided that the County~· at any time, sell and convey
:·· 2

ty to the former owner or his assigns for the delinquent taxes,
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Obviously, the County having absolute legal title, also had the right t:
sell and convey the property to any other person, but the plaintiffv"'
given judgment, nonetheless,

In the case at bar, the plaintiff obviously realized aneco:..
omic benefit from the continued existence of the insured building wh'.c:
housed his merchandise, and did in fact suffer severe economic loss
when it burned down with his possessions inside,

Although it may be

true that Salt Lake City had the right to require the plaintiff to remore
his possessions from the building at any time, until the plaintiff actLl2i
did. so, either voluntarily or by coercion, he had an economic interest
in the building's continued existence, if only as shelter and protectio''
for the merchandise inside,

The plaintiff had a right to continue top':

tha.t interest, which is clearly insurable under the case law cited, and
the defendant has never offered to return any p3.rt of the premium piid
by the plaintiff as consideration for the insul'ance contract issued bi·
the defendant,
At the time of the fire, the condemnation proceedings'"''
still pending, and the plaintiff still had legal title to the property, wbic.
did not p3.SS to Salt Lake City until May, 1976,

Section 78-34-IS, U,C.

{1953), provides:
·1

b d given, t.
"When payxnents have been made and the on h tastt'.'
the plaintiff elects to give one, as required ~y \ eudgm"
preceding sections, the court must make a fina l
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of condemnation, which must describe the property condemned and the purpose of such condemnation, A copy
of the judgment must be filed in the office of the recorder
of the county, and thereupon the property described
therein shall vest in the plaintiff for the purpose therein
specified, "
Under Section 78-34-14, U.C.A. (1953), and Section 7834-16, U. C. A. (1953), it was possible on the date of the fire, that title
would never have passed from the plaintiff, had the final award not been
p,1id or the condemnation proceedings not been completed for any other
reason,

Such a possibility, even though remote, is enough to find an

insurable interest in the owner,
A primary objection raised to the p3.yment of the claim in

this type of case, is that such p3.yment would constitute double payment
for the property and amount to a windfall to the plaintiff.

Even if this

were true, the previously cited cases declare that such a benefit to
the plaintiff would not invalidate the insurance contract or void the insurance
comp:i.ny 1 s obligation to pay for the loss it agreed to insure against,

In

this case, however, such an allegation of double payment is not well
founded, as a review of the pleadings in the condemnation case entered
as evidence (Exhibit "A") in this case, particularly the Stipulation for
Judgment and the Judgment, will show,

The anticipated recovery under

the insurance policy was basic to the settlement figure accepted by the
plaintiff.
On the other hand, to disallow recovery ':>Y the plaintiff
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would amount to a windfall to the insurance comp.3.ny, by allowing it to
avoid p3.yment for a loss which it voluntarily insured against, and for
which it accepted and retained the premiums, simply because of the acti
of one not even a p3.rty to this lawsuit, creating a situation which plaint:'
did not desire and over which he had no control,
CONCLUSION
Based upon all of the foregoing considerations, the trial
court erred in finding that the plaintiff had no insurable interest in the
building on the date it burned, and its judgment should be reversed anJ
judgment granted to the plaintiff in the sum of $20, 000, 00, the amount
of coverage afforded under the policy issued by the defendant,

Respectfully submitted,

Carl E, Kingston
53 West An"elo Avenue
Salt Lake city, Utah 84115
Attorney for Fla inti ff and Appoi'
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